



How Genealogies Can Affect the Space of Reasons
MATTHIEU QUELOZ
Philosophy, University of Basel
Can genealogical explanations affect the space of reasons? Those who think so
commonly face two objections. The first objection maintains that attempts to
derive reasons from claims about the genesis of something commit the genetic
fallacy—they conflate genesis and justification. One way for genealogies to side-
step this objection is to focus on the functional origins of practices—to show that,
given certain facts about us and our environment, certain conceptual practices
are rational because apt responses. But this invites a second objection, which
maintains that attempts to derive current from original function suffer from conti-
nuity failure—the conditions in response towhich something originated no longer
obtain. This paper shows how normatively ambitious genealogies can steer clear
of both problems. It first maps out various ways in which genealogies can involve
non-fallacious genetic arguments before arguing that some genealogies do not
invite the charge of the genetic fallacy if they are interpreted as revealing the
original functions of conceptual practices. However, they then incur the burden
of showing that the conditions relative to which practices function continuously
obtain. Taking its cue from the genealogies of E. J. Craig, Bernard Williams,
and Miranda Fricker, the paper shows how model-based genealogies can avoid
continuity failures by identifying bases of continuity in the demands we face.
ABSTRACT
A gainst the widespread view that explanations of how somethingoriginated—genealogical explanations—are normatively inert,1 I
argue in this paper that genealogical explanations can be used to affect the
space of reasons. I do this by showing how genealogies can overcome two
objections thought to form stumbling-blocks for normatively ambitious
genealogies purporting to subvert or vindicate their object. The first ob-
jection maintains that attempts to derive reasons from claims about the
genesis of something commit the genetic fallacy—they conflate genesis and
justification.2 There are basically two ways of side-stepping this objection.
1 See, inter alia, Dutilh Novaes (2015); Finken (2012); Fraser (1981); Glock (2008a; 2008b,
p. 101); Goudge (1961); Hamblin (2004, p. 45); Hanson (1967); Hoy (1994); Kaplan
(2002, p. 13); Kim (1990); Koopman (2013, p. 20); Rosenbaum (2002); Wiener (1946). The
widespread view is that genealogies can advance our understanding of philosophically
puzzling concepts, but that they do not directly justify or debunk them (Dutilh Novaes
2015, pp. 100-101).
2 This objection was raised against Bernard Williams’s genealogy by Colin Koopman
(2013, p. 20). For further discussions which see the genetic fallacy as clouding the
prospects of normatively ambitious genealogical explanations, see Finken (2012); Fraser
(1981); Glock (2008a; 2008b, p. 101); Goudge (1961); Hamblin (2004, p. 45); Hanson
(1967); (Hoy 1994); Kaplan (2002, p. 13); Kim (1990); Koopman (2013, p. 20); Rosenbaum
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One is to show that the genealogies in question involve non-fallacious genetic
arguments; the other is to show that correctly understood, these genealogies
do not invite the charge of the genetic fallacy, because they do not really
involve genetic arguments at all. In the interest of thoroughness, I will
indicate viable versions of both strategies,3 and also defend genealogies
with normative import against themain charge they run into when they are
not interpreted as involving genetic arguments. I will first map out various
ways in which genealogies can involve non-fallacious genetic arguments. I
will then show that some genealogies do not invite the charge of the genetic
fallacy if they are interpreted as genealogical inquiries into the functional
origins of our conceptual practices (a catch-all termmeant to cover concepts,
values, virtues, and other practices of epistemic and normative assessment).
On the reading I shall offer, these genealogies can yield pragmatic vin-
dications of these conceptual practices by showing how, given particular
facts about the needs of concept-users in particular circumstances, certain
conceptual practices are rational because apt responses.
As a result of this functionalist interpretation, however, these genealo-
gies invite a second objection akin to the charge of the genetic fallacy. The
objection is that genealogies which try to derive current from original
function suffer from continuity failure—they founder on the fact that the
conditions in response towhich something originated no longer obtain.4As
Nicholas Smyth (2017) has recently argued in response to the genealogies
of Richard Joyce (2006), Jesse Prinz (2007), and Philip Kitcher (2011),5 ascrip-
tions of current functionality on the basis of genealogy are warranted only
if the conditions relative to which something was originally functional still
(2002); Wiener (1946). For more optimistic assessments, see Crouch (1991, 1993); Dutilh
Novaes (2015); Klement (2002); Lavine (1962); Sober (1994); Ward (2010).
3 This two-pronged approach takes care of the lack of consensus over what counts as a
genetic argument and what counts as a genetic fallacy: any given normatively ambitious
genealogy either involves a genetic argument or it does not; if it does, section 1 lays
out how this argument can avoid the genetic fallacy; if it does not, the genealogy is not
at risk of committing the genetic fallacy in the first place; but then—so I argue—it is
likely to be at risk of foundering on continuity failure (which on some understandings
would also count as a form of the genetic fallacy); if it is, section 3 lays out how
such a genealogy can avoid continuity failure; either way, it emerges that neither the
genetic fallacy nor continuity failure are insuperable stumbling-blocks for normatively
ambitious genealogies.
4 Smyth (2017). I discuss Smyth’s objection in detail in §2.
5 Looking beyond disciplinary boundaries, one might also include Jonathan Haidt (2012),
Joshua Greene (2013), and Michael Tomasello (2016).
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obtain, and Smyth suggests that these genealogies founder on continuity
failure.
A successful genealogy with normative import must therefore steer
clear of the genetic fallacy without foundering on continuity failure. A
model for how to do this, I argue, is provided by the state-of-nature-based
genealogical inquiries into the point of individual concepts and virtues
offered by E.J. Craig (1990), Bernard Williams (2002), and Miranda Fricker
(2007). I suggest that these genealogies are best readasmaking ascriptions of
current functionality based on genealogical inquiries into structural origins,
i.e. into facts about us and our environments that our practices are rooted in
and arise in answer to.6 Although these genealogies can draw on historical
information, they are closer to dynamic model-building than to standard
historiography.7 Yet they are still properly called genealogical. This comes
out if we contrast them with their explicitly non-genealogical sibling that
Fricker went on to develop: these so-called paradigm-based explanations take
an actual paradigm case of a given practice, hypothesise its point given
the needs of actual parties to the practice, and explain further cases of
the practice as elaborations of the paradigm case serving the same point
in different ways.8 The genealogies of Craig, Williams, and Fricker differ
from paradigm-based explanations in two respects: first, they set out from
constructed models or idealised prototypes of our practices rather than
from the actual practices themselves; and second, they introduce a develop-
mental axis to understand how and why we might have gotten from these
prototypes to the practices we in fact have. In contrast to paradigm-based
explanations, these genealogies start out from a primitive form of a solution
6 Yet they are not inquiries into transcendent and “immobile forms” preceding the flux
of history of the kind that Foucault (1971) rejected in favour of inquiries into the
multiple causes of the emergence of things. Formore on Foucault’s notion of emergence,
see Koopman (2013, pp. 39–44). For a conciliatory discussion of Foucault’s critique
of the search for “origins” in relation to the genealogies of Craig and Williams, see
Fricker (Forthcoming). As Fricker also notes, the key point is that their genealogies are
concerned with practical necessity rather than metaphysical necessity.
7 This focus on genealogies that are interpretable as primarily constituting a form of
model-building rather than a formofdocumentaryhistoriography is the reasonwhy I do
not explicitly discuss the better-known genealogies ofNietzsche and Foucault (although
the broader discussion of the genetic fallacy in section 1 implicitly encompasses them as
well). This is not to deny that at least where Nietzsche is concerned, some genealogical
passages may be amenable to such an interpretation. But arguing the point here would
take us too far afield. For readings of some of Nietzsche’s early genealogies in this
direction, see Queloz (2017b, Forthcoming-a, Manuscript).
8 See Fricker (2016, Forthcoming).
How Genealogies Can Affect the Space of Reasons • 4
to a basic problem that is not and indeed could not be actual in a stable way
(which is why a fictional construct is called for). For example, Williams
begins his genealogy with prototypical forms of truthfulness—“Accuracy”
and “Sincerity”—which, at the beginning of his genealogy, are understood
in purely instrumental terms as means to foster the flow of information,
but prove unstable as long as they are sustained only by instrumental
concerns. The value of starting from such an idealization lies in the stark
simplicity with which it brings out the functional pressures that both
require a solution along these lines and require it to develop beyond that
primitive form.9 But this approach is genealogical not only in considering
these functional origins. It is also genealogical in two further respects: first,
in considering the primitive form’s elaboration in response to further generic
needs anticipatable from within the model (in Craig’s genealogy, this is
exemplified by the gradual “objectivisation” of the concept of knowledge,
i.e. its development into a concept that is less directly tied to subjective
needs);10 and second, in considering the primitive form’s elaboration in
response to increasingly socio-historically local needs. Based on historical
information, the genealogical explanation is progressively tailored to the
practices that we have, now and around here (in Williams’s genealogy, this
is exemplified by the elaboration of Accuracy to encompass statements
about the distant past in response to developments in Ancient Greece, or
by that of Sincerity to encompass the demand for authenticity in response
to developments in the Romantic period).11 If the genealogist ends up with
something sufficiently like our local form of the practice in question, he
or she will have a reasonable claim to having explained why we might
have come by the practice in terms of its original point and subsequent
elaboration in response to historically situated needs.
Such a reading of the genealogies of Craig, Williams, and Fricker raises
many questions worth pursuing, but in this paper, I shall restrict myself
to just one aspect: how these genealogies suggest a way of tackling the
9 ContraMcGinn (2003), the genealogical dimension is thus more than a colourful but
ultimately superfluous illustration. I offer a fuller defence of Williams’s genealogy
against this objection in Queloz (Forthcoming-b).
10 Craig (1990, chs. 10-12; 1993, ch. 3).
11 Williams (2002, chs. 7-8). Here, as he puts it, philosophy must involve itself in history in
order to achieve what it sets out to achieve (2002, 93). Another example of a functional
genealogy that is progressively tailored to a particular socio-historical situation is
Williams’s derivation of the modern liberal idea of liberty from a generic and primitive
idea of freedom (Williams 2005b).
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problem of continuity failure. My contention will be that they put us in a
position to reveal a practice’s functionality for us while deriving the need
for the continual discharge of that function from persistent facts about
the kinds of creatures we are. Such genealogies thereby avoid assuming
continuity in the practical demands we face, because precisely what they
are is attempts to identify bases of continuity in those demands. They are
not arguments depending on continuity, but arguments for it.
1. Two Ways of Connecting Origin and Justification
For our purposes, the genetic fallacy can be understood as the error of
treating items in the context of formation of conceptual practices as if they
belonged to the context of justification when in fact they do not.12 We can
acknowledge that there is such an error without committing ourselves
to the much stronger claim that nothing can be inferred about the justi-
fication of something solely from facts about its origins.13 Items in the
context of formation can form part of the context of justification, but they
12 This understanding is adapted from Salmon (1973, p. 11). Alternative characterisations
of the genetic fallacy maintain that it consists in judging the truth of an assertion on
the basis of its source rather than by the evidence or argument available for it (Kaplan
2002, p. 13), or conflating temporal or historical origin with logical nature (Hamblin
2004, p. 45; Koopman 2013, p. 20; Rosenbaum 2002; Wiener 1946). Glock defines it
as “the mistake of deducing claims about the validity of a theory or the content of a
concept from information about its historical origins, including information about the
causes of its emergence” (2008b, p. 101). TheOxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines it as
“any mistake of inferring something about the nature of some topic from a proposition
about its origins” (Blackburn 2016, p. “genetic fallacy”). Inferring current from ancestral
function is also sometimes described as a genetic fallacy (Dennett 1995, 465). Finken
(2012) even brings the acceptance of a belief for pragmatic reasons under that heading.
Hanson (1967) argues that these various uses share nothing but their name and the fact
that they involve some kind of inference from historical statements to statements which
are not merely historical. Similarly, Goudge (1961) claims that there is no single mistake
in reasoning which goes by the name of “genetic fallacy”; rather, the name designates
a cluster of mistakes associated with the giving of genetic explanations.
13 This is argued at length by Sober (1994). Other defences of genetic reasoning include Kle-
ment’s (2002) vindication of a certain form of self-referential abductive reasoning. Ward
(2010) sees a role for modest, inductive genetic reasoning: it acts as a corrective against
prejudice by calling into question (without conclusively undermining) justifications
coming from particular sources. Lavine (1962) offers a defence of a functionalist version
of genetic reasoning: to understand the function of something requires understanding
what it is functional for, and this in turn requires relating it to the situation to which
it answers. For a qualified defence of genetic reasoning relating the history to the
philosophy of science, see Hanson (1967). For a similarly qualified defence of genetic
reasoning in the context of feminist philosophy, see Crouch (1991). Crouch (1993) also
offers a more general defence by problematising the distinction between the contexts
of discovery and justification.
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can properly do so only if there is a connection between an aspect of the
context of formation and the justification of the item in question. What is
fallacious is not the inference from origins to justification per se, but the
inference from irrelevant information about origins to justification. And of
course, whether some piece of information is relevant to the justification of
a given conclusion is often precisely what is at issue. What normatively
ambitious genealogical explanations depend on, then, is that there be such
a connection rendering some aspect of the context of formation relevant to
the context of justification.14 The charge of the genetic fallacy thus serves
as a reminder that contexts of formation and contexts of justification are
distinct spheres. Yet there may be overlaps—peculiarities of one sphere
which lead it to extend into the other. As this image already indicates, this
can happen in one of two ways. Either the space of reasons is itself such
that it locally encompasses certain formation processes; or these formation
processes are such that knowledge of them can contribute to the vindication
or subversion of their objects. Either we have genetically justified practices,
or we have genealogies yielding justifications.
Take genetically justified practices first. Claims about the formation pro-
cesses of conceptual and evaluative practicesmay affect the space of reasons
because these claims concern practices whose authority is itself a function
of their formation.15 That is to say, formation processes are part of the truth
conditions of the propositions fromwhich the practice derives its authority.
We may call practices which understand themselves or claim authority for
themselves in terms which knowledge of their formation can undermine
genetically justified practices. Examples of such genetically justified practices
abound in politics and law, where it is common for practices to derive their
authority from the procedure by which they were formed. In a democracy,
for instance, a decisionmight be legitimated by the fact that it is the product
of a democratic procedure. Similarly, many rituals and traditions justify
14 Pashman (1970) argues that relevance depends on there being a causal link between the
context of formation and the context of justification. But in many cases, no such philo-
sophically neutral ways of determining relevance will be available: the Archimedean
standpoint is lacking (Crouch 1993; Srinivasan 2015). Crouch argues that it should not
be surprising that philosophies that draw on Marxist or Freudian explanations seem to
commit the genetic fallacy. The genetic fallacy was formulated largely in opposition
to just the kinds of assumptions on which these theories depend. Feminist theories,
insofar as they accept these assumptions, will also appear to commit the genetic fallacy.
Crouch (1991) offers a nuanced evaluation.
15 See Williams (2014b, p. 410) and Gutting (2005, p. 50).
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their continuation by reference to their authoritative origins—things are
done a certain way because some respected originator of the ritual or
tradition did them that way. A particularly striking example is the Catholic
notion of apostolic succession, according to which the spiritual authority of
present-day clerics derives from the uninterrupted transmission (through
successive popes and bishops) of the original authority of the Apostles.
Indeed, it is characteristic of religious practices that they revolve around
wide-screen representations of their own origins from which they derive
their self-understanding and authority.
In all these cases, genealogical explanations can impinge on the space of
reasons because the rational articulation of the conceptual and evaluative
practices in question itself refers to their formation. Whether a practice is
genetically justified or not is something to be determined by looking at how
it presently functions.When practices are genetically justified, however, this
justificatory connection to their own formation renders them susceptible
to vindication and subversion by genealogical explanations. The structure
of such vindications and subversions will then be as follows:
Vindicatory Genealogy of a Genetically Justified Practice:
conceptual practice P understands itself or claims authority for itself in
terms of a representation RFP of its own formation process FP.
Inquiry into how FPmight have given rise to P suggests that RFP is true.
Therefore, the authority of P is to that extent vindicated.
Subversive Genealogy of a Genetically Justified Practice:
conceptual practice P understands itself and claims authority for itself in
terms of a representation RFP of its own formation process FP.
Inquiry into how FPmight have given rise to P suggests that RFP is false.
Therefore, the authority of P is to that extent subverted.
I take it that this is the standard way in which genealogy has been thought
to overcome the genetic fallacy: by exploiting the fact that the target phe-
nomenon understands itself and claims authority for itself in terms which
a genealogy can undermine. For example, liberalism has been claimed to
be the product of reason’s march through history—the rationally inevitable
endpoint of a historical process of becoming alive to universal reasons.16 A
16 This is a point of contention between Thomas Nagel (1997, 2009) and Bernard Williams
(2014a), for example. Williams writes: “[W]hen it is argued that the values of contempo-
rary liberalism cannot possibly be criticised in terms of their history, this will be so only
to the extent that those values can be separated from the claim—one which is often
made for them—that they have emerged from the spread of reason and represent a
cognitive achievement” (2014b, p. 410). See Queloz (2017a) for further discussion.
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genealogical inquiry into the actual formation process of liberalism might
throw doubt on this representation, and thereby subvert the authority
liberalism claims for itself in terms of the march of reason. More generally,
a genealogy can sap the authority of beliefs or ideas by revealing their
contingency insofar as these demand authority for themselves in terms that
are incompatible with that contingency.
This is not to deny that genealogy can also have more indirect effects
on authority.17 Even when a practice appears normal, natural, or necessary
without its authority depending on its being taken to be so, genealogical
inquiry can enable a critical reevaluation of authority. It primarily does
this by showing that people can live differently, because they have lived
differently. Generating this sense of alternatives pulls aside the veneer of
inevitability. This is not itself a subversion of authority. But, as Elisabeth
Anderson has put it, it converts dogmas into tools that we can choose to use
or not (2001, p. 22). It turns dogmatic acceptance into critical assessment.
However, there are other ways in which genealogy can impinge on the
space of reasons which we miss if we focus only on contingency. These
otherways are not a matter of how practices claim authority for themselves,
but of how andwhy they originated. This is where we turn from genetically
justified practices to genealogies yielding justifications.
In this second way of connecting origin and justification, it is not the
justificatory structures, but the formation processes themselves which are
such that knowledge of them can contribute to a vindication or subversion
of practices, or simply exhibit them as rationally contingent. Let us say
that a practice P is rationally contingent to the extent that the considerations
contributing to the best explanation of why a group G engages in P fail to
provide reasons to prefer P over possible rivals to P, where possible rivals
to P are unrealised alternatives to P competing for the place in our lives
occupied by P, and notably include the abandonment of P. We can then
distinguish three ways in which insights into the formation process of a
practice can bear on our understanding of it:
Vindicatory Genealogy:
Group G engages in conceptual practice P.
17 Koopman (2013, p. 95) provides an illuminating account of this broadly Foucauldian
employment of genealogy as initiatory rather than constitutive of critique. He argues
that it is not so much the fact that, but the way in which something contingently arose
which will be of interest, because it is only the latter which makes explicit and opens
up to critique the enabling background assumptions of the practice (2013, p. 21).
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The best explanation for why G engages in P is that P is the result of
formation process FP.
FP is vindicatory, i.e., it offers reasons to prefer P over possible rivals,
including the abandonment of P.
Therefore, the continuation of P is to that extent justified.18
Non-Vindicatory Genealogy:
Group G engages in conceptual practice P.
The best explanation for why G engages in P is that P is the result of
formation process FP.
FP is not vindicatory, i.e., it fails to yield reasons to prefer P over possible
rivals, including the abandonment of P.
Therefore, P is to that extent rationally contingent.
Subversive Genealogy:
Group G engages in conceptual practice P.
The best explanation for why G engages in P is that P is the result of
formation process FP.
FP is incriminating, i.e., it offers reasons against the continuation of P.
Therefore, the abandonment of P is to that extent justified.
Twonoteworthy features of this construal are that it is abductive and tripartite.
There are two reasons for reconstructing the genealogies at issue here as
a form of abductive reasoning (i.e. reasoning to the best explanation). The
first is that it enables us to offer genealogies even where we do not have
knowledge about how a given practice actually came about (knowledge
which a sound deductive argument would require). The second reason is
that to give a sound non-abductive version of the argument, one would
need to have established that P is the result of formation process FP, which
in turn presupposes the existence of formation process FP, and this is likely
to beg the question against those who dispute that P merits respect and
continuation. On the abductive reconstruction, by contrast, the argument
is available even in the absence of knowledge; and the existence of the
practices acts as evidence for the existence of the formation processes
imbuing them with authority.19
18 Here I am generalising to conceptual and evaluative practices a pattern of genetic
reasoning spelled out by Klement (2002, 390). Klement construes abductive genetic
arguments for the truth of a given belief p as having the following form: Person(s) S
believes p. The best explanation for why S believes p is that S’s belief that p is the result
of belief-forming process f. Belief-forming process f is highly reliable, i.e., it produces
true beliefs much more often than it produces false beliefs. Therefore, S’s belief that p
is true.
19 For this reason, Klement speaks of self-referential abductive reasoning (2002, p. 392).
An example is the ending of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, where Levine perceives his own
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As for distinguishing three possible forms by including the possibility
that a genealogy may simply prove non-vindicatory, this points to an im-
portant feature of genealogies that take conceptual or evaluative practices
rather than beliefs as their objects. We saw that genealogies of genetically
justified practices included only two rather than three possible forms.
This is because genetically justified practices are matter of representing
formation processes as being a certain way. These representations obey the
principle of bivalence: they are either true or false. If a genealogy fails to
yield evidence that a certain representation of formation processes is true,
this will be prima facie evidence of its being false. Hence, genealogies of
genetically justifiedpracticeswill tend to be eithervindicatory or subversive.
But if we start at the other end, i.e. with the formation process of concepts,
values, and practices, we get three rather than two possible argumentative
structures. This is because concepts, values, and practices are neither true
nor false. They can, however, be evaluated: there can be reasons for or
against living by those practices rather than by possible alternatives. They
can be more or less apt tools for fulfilling our purposes. But this allows for
the possibility that certain aspects of our ways of going on are rationally
contingent (and even where our having some form of a practice or concept
is not rationally contingent, the specific form it takes in our own cultural
situation may be). Hence, a genealogical explanation of how we came to
live by a given concept, value, or practice may yield reasons in favour of it,
reasons against it, or neither.
This third outcome—finding that our conceptual and evaluative prac-
tices are rationally contingent—neednotbedestabilising. It simply indicates
that the practice is rationally contingent, in the sense that it is not justified
against possible rivals.20And asWittgenstein pointed out, to use something
without justification does not mean to use it wrongfully.21 With conceptual
moral values as evidence for the truth of divine revelation, which in turn vindicates
those values (Tolstoy 2014, Part VIII, chs. 12 and 13). Another example is Descartes’s
argument for the existence of God in the Third Meditation: among the contents of his
consciousness, Descartes finds, is the concept of unified perfection, i.e. the concept
of God; this concept of unified perfection, he maintains, could not have come from
something less than perfect; since he himself is imperfect, the best explanation for
his having the concept of God is that it was implanted in him by God himself, as the
mark of the maker stamped on his work (Descartes 1996, 3.51). See Williams (2005a, pp.
134–137) for further discussion of this argument.
20 That genealogies need not be normatively determinative is the central point in Koopman
(2013, ch. 2).
21 Wittgenstein (2009, §289).
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and evaluative practices, the absence of reasons for or against is a stable
result which need not be due to epistemic limitations on our part. While it
is constitutive of beliefs that they aim at the truth, our tools and practices of
sense-making do not aim at being rationally vindicated against all possible
rivals. It is a mistake to take contingency to be in itself an objection to
our concepts and values. The impression that contingency is problematic
derives from two related, but equally erroneous ideas: (i) that we must
strive for the set of sense-making practices that is absolutely best; and (ii)
that wemust do so as characterless selves completely unencumbered by the
contingent influences of cultural and biographical circumstance. Against
these ideas, we can insist that our task is not to find the concepts and values
that are best from a point of view that is as free of contingent historical
perspective as possible.22 We want the sense-making tools that best make
sense of the world to us; but whatmakes sense to us is in turn a function
of who we are and of which concepts shape our concerns, both of which
are largely matters of contingent biographical and historical circumstance;
this is not a constraint to be overcome, but rather what enables our sense-
making in the first place. The sense-making self cannot be separated from
everything that it contingently is—it is not, in the first instance, biased by
historical processes, but constructed by them.23 There is no characterless self
(and even if there were, it would be spectacularly ill-equipped to do what
is expected of it). Consequently, it is not an objection to our concepts and
values that they are local and contingent. The aim is not that they should
be ultimately and timelessly desirable, but that they should have a point
for us. This is why revealing their contingency is not in itself subversive.
We thus have two ways of connecting origin and justification: either
claims about the origins of practices may affect the space of reasons be-
cause these claims concern practices whose authority is itself a function
of their formation, or the formation processes themselves are such that
knowledge of them can contribute to a vindication or subversion of the
practices. Revelations of contingency can sap the authority of practices
in the former case, but contingency is normatively inert in the latter case.
However, it does not follow that there are no instances of the latter case.
Formation process can be authoritative, i.e. they can offer reasons to prefer
22 I take it that this is the point which Williams (2006, pp. 193–194), in a difficult passage
of “Philosophy as Humanistic Discipline,” urges against Rorty (1989, chs. 3–4).
23 Williams (1993, pp. 158–159).
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a practice over possible rivals, and hence genealogies can have normative
force independently of how practices claim authority for themselves. The
connecting element is the notion of function, which straddles the space of
causes and the space of reasons. The question then is how insights into
formation processes can yield reasons via insights into functionality.
2. Functionality and Continuity
There are many ways of looking at formation processes. We can trace out
the meanderings of historical development, date and locate key stages,
and map out intricate webs of interconnections between processes. But
we can also take a more functional approach and try to identify the salient
stabilising factors that led to certain features being retained in virtue of
their aptness in serving certain ends. This will reveal the functional origins
of the practice, the more or less contingent facts it is rooted in and which
it forms a pragmatic response to. This way lies the path from origin to
vindication that will be my focus here: genealogy can be vindicatory by
yielding a pragmatic vindication—by showing that, given certain needs and
purposes and given certain facts about us and our environment, certain
ways of going on are rational because apt responses.24
Genealogies in this vein try to connect contexts of formation and con-
texts of justification via functionality. If the question arises, in any given
case, whether a conceptual or evaluative practice should be continued, a
genealogy can try to answer the question by revealing the function of the
practice in relation to our needs and purposes. It does this by presenting
the practice as rooted in a set of conditions which together generate a prob-
lem to which the practice constitutes a solution. The genealogy thereby
shows the practice to be in one sense contingent and in another sense
necessary. It shows it to be contingent upon humans and their environment
being a certain way; but it also shows it to be practically necessary given
these facts, since the challenge they give rise to exerts a strong pragmatic
pressure on the remedying practice to arise. If our interest in telling the
genealogy is merely historical or explanatory—a matter of grasping how a
certain practice could possibly have arisen without divine interference, for
24 In the sense that a community of practice will have reason to cultivate the practice. My
use of the term “rational” is not meant to mark a distinction between the normativity
of reasons and the normativity of rationality as drawn, for instance, by Kolodny (2005).
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instance—this will already be enough. But the genealogy will have a more
than merely explanatory upshot to the extent that we have reason to think
that the root conditions still obtain. Insofar as they do, this will suggest
that our present cultural situation involves similar dynamics, and that
our present token of the original practice, marked and altered by various
contingencies though it may be, still functions, at base, as a response to this
same predicament.
The guiding idea of such genealogies is to use insights into why a prac-
tice originated—insights yielded by genealogical explanation—to generate
insights into what the function of the practice now is. If the function is
one we need to see discharged, we shall to that extent have a reason to
continue engaging in the practice. If, on the other hand, the practice is one
which we do not need to see discharged, we shall have been provided with
a reason to abandon the practice. This is an attempt to side-step the genetic
fallacy by using the context of formation as a guide to current functionality,
which is in turn a relevant consideration when it comes to the practice’s
justification. A successful inference of this sort, which moves from origin
to justification via functionality, involves two steps: one from reflection on
how and why a practice originated to its original function; and one from
its original function to its current function.
But while the first inference seems easy enough, the second holds diffi-
culties. These difficulties have been clearly brought out by Smyth’s (2017)
critique of inferences from the original function to the current function
of morality.25 Smyth argues that if ascriptions of current functionality
on the basis of genealogy are to be warranted, the conditions relative to
which something originally was functional must still obtain. Smyth thinks,
however, that the conditions relative to which the genealogists he discusses
takemorality originally to have been functional no longer obtain. Therefore,
their genealogically derived ascriptions of functionality to contemporary
morality are not warranted.26
The key difficulty for function-oriented genealogies, then—the “func-
tionalist’s burden,” as Smyth calls it—is that they presuppose continuity in
25 The genealogists Smyth focuses on are Kitcher (2011), Joyce (2006), Sinclair (2012), and
Prinz (2007), though there is a suggestion that the same difficulties extend to Hume
(2000) and Williams (2002). See Smyth (2017, pp. 1130n4, 1131).
26 Smyth (2017, pp. 1137–1138).
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the conditions relative to which a practice is functional. For our purposes,
we can reformulate this constraint as follows:
Continuity:
Necessarily, for any P, G, and RCi : if RC1 , RC2 , . . . RCn is the set of root
conditions relative to which practice P was originally functional under
some description, then the inference from the original function of practice
P to its current function in group G is justified only if RC1 , RC2 , . . . RCn
also obtains in G.
When this constraint is not met, genealogically derived ascriptions of func-
tionality exhibit what Smyth calls continuity failure (2017, p. 1137). The
attempt to side-step the genetic fallacy by using the context of formation as
a guide to current functionality then founders on the fact that the context
of formation does not exhibit enough continuity with the present to inform
the context of justification.
Smyth acknowledges that there might in principle be a level of descrip-
tion at which root conditions exhibit the continuity necessary to justifying
genealogically derived ascriptions of current functionality: we, like our an-
cestors, live in groups and need to get along and solve various coordination
problems (2017, p. 1134). But on Smyth’s reconstruction of Kitcher’s (2011)
and Joyce’s (2006) genealogies, the conditions that they in fact appeal to as
explanantia stand no chance of obtaining today. Kitcher’s explanation only
holds for small groups (50 to 150 individuals) in which the probability of a
renewed encounter is relatively high and the influence of a given interac-
tion on future interactions is accordingly important—the “shadow of the
future,” as game theory has it, looms large in each interaction.27 Smyth
points out that as society grows, the importance of this effect dwindles.
Modern societies no longer fulfil the conditions that do the explanatory
work in Kitcher’s genealogy (2017, p. 1134). Similarly, Joyce’s explanation
invokes conditiuons in which resources are so scarce that individuals
cannot afford to sacrifice greater long-term for lesser short-term gains; and
in which group stability is so fragile that any selfish free riding would be
severely detrimental to the group’s functioning. Again, Smyth sees neither
condition fulfilled in modern society (2017, p. 1137).
Yet even if continuously obtaining conditions could be identified, Smyth
argues, this would have to be at the cost of their explanatory force—the
assumption being that morality would be highly unlikely to evolve in the
27 See, e.g., Lange, Klapwĳk, and Munster (2011).
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sort of large-scale, relatively secure, and resource-abundant society we
live in (2017, p. 1137). Hence, no conditions sufficiently broad to be met
by such a modern society would be of help in explaining why morality
arose. Smyth’s conclusion is that moral genealogists must choose between
explaining morality’s emergence and uncovering its current function. If
they go for the former, they will diagnose morality’s functionality relative
to conditions which no longer obtain. If they go for the latter, the most
promising genealogical path to functional ascriptions will be one which
focuses on modern history rather than on our Pleistocene ancestors; but
then they will learn little about why morality originally arose. They cannot
have it both ways.
Two qualifications are in order here. First, genealogies do not depend on
Continuity being satisfied society-wide. It may be enough if the conditions
in response to which a practice arose exhibit only partial continuity in
certain sub-domains of society, such as the family or the football-club.
Second, it is precisely the point of some function-oriented stories about
how our practices originated that Continuity fails to obtain—in recent
years, evolutionary psychology has pursued the idea that certain traits
originated as functional adaptations to an ancestral environment which
markedly differs from our present-day environment, leaving us with many
dysfunctional tendencies or biases.
Nevertheless, Smyth is surely right that the Continuity constraint is
the crucial hurdle for genealogies aiming to reveal the current functional-
ity—as opposed to dysfunctionality—of practices, and if Smyth’s critique
applies not only to Kitcher’s (2011) and Joyce’s (2006) genealogies, but to
all genealogies in this vein, it seems that they can avoid the genetic fallacy
only at the cost of foundering on continuity failures. Yet as we shall see, the
genealogies of Craig (1990), Williams (2002), and Fricker (2007) indicate
how genealogy can avoid continuity failures.
3. Avoiding Continuity Failures
There are two ways in which genealogies can avoid continuity failures. The
first is to operate at high levels of description which abstract away from the
particulars of given token situations and bring into view features extending
over a wide range of situations. Call this the high level of description strategy.
The second is to show that the need for the practice in question—the focal
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practice—has a firm basis in and derives from basic needs humans can be
assumed to have anyway. Call this the anchoring in human nature strategy.
Both of these labels will seem rather off-putting to readers suspicious of
sweeping generalisations or speculative just-so stories about human nature.
Yet while the labels may be alarming, I shall argue that the strategies they
label are executed in ways that make them reassuringly modest in the
commitments they undertake.
The genealogies of Craig, Williams, and Fricker pursue both of these
strategies together: they focus on the general and anchor it in the basic. For
the sake of clarity, we can prise these two strategies apart. The first strategy
of these genealogists is to operate at such a high level of description that
they do not (in the first instance) make reference to any particular point in
history at all. They start out from what philosophical tradition has come to
call, perhaps misleadingly, a “state of nature.” But this is not a depiction of
life in the Pleistocene. Nor is it any other point on the timeline of history.
It is best understood as a model, an idealising representation of functional
dynamics at a level of abstraction familiar from game theory and rational
choice theory.28 The state of nature depicts how a set of root needs under
certain root circumstances generate further needs, including, centrally, a
focal need to which a prototypical form of the practice we are interested
in—the focal practice—constitutes a rational because functional response.
At this level of abstraction, the model is no more a model of one point on
the timeline of history than of any other. As Craig notes: “Reference to
mankind’s prehistory was no essential part of my argument” (2007, p. 192).
What his genealogy was meant to show was that “the core of the concept
of knowledge is an outcome of certain very general facts about the human
situation” (1990, p. 10). Similarly, Williams insists that the state of nature
is “not intended to represent some early hominid environment” (2014b, p.
411). Rather, it is part of “a fictional storywhich represents a new reason for
action as being developed in a simplified situation as a function of motives,
reactions, psychological processes which we have reason to acknowledge
already” (2000, p. 159). And Fricker,who takes up and develops Craig’s and
Williams’s state-of-nature models, understands the device as a “maximally
ahistorical setting,” a construct designed to characterise our most basic
needs andwhat they entail (2007, 108–9). Thismeans that the state of nature
28 See Kusch (2009, 2011, 2013) and Kusch and McKenna (Forthcoming) for a reading of
Craig’s genealogy along these lines.
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can be as much a model of the present as of a given earlier society. Given
this, the question is not so much whether one can, in principle, infer from
that model to the present—that comes for free with its being a model of
a timespan that includes the present: it is the point of the model that it
permits this kind of inference. The question is whether it is a goodmodel.
Such model-based genealogies make ascriptions of current functionality
not on the basis of claims about a certain period in our past, but on the
basis of generic models of our most general predicaments. Insofar as they
are genealogies at all, they are genealogical inquiries into structural origins,
i.e. into the highly general facts about us and our environments that our
practices are rooted in.29 Model-based genealogies can elucidate and vindi-
cate a practice by presenting it as structurally rooted in, and in that sense
as originating in, a set of conditions, the root conditions, which together
generate a focal need to which the focal practice constitutes a solution. The
root conditions appealed to by Craig, Williams, and Fricker—a need for
information about p, or a need for cooperation in φ-ing—are so highly
general and abstractly characterised that they can be plausibly be thought
to obtain in anything recognisable as a human society. This is how the high
level of description strategy aims to secure continuity: by characterising
the functional dynamics out of which practices arise and by which they
are held in place at a level of abstraction which renders them applicable to
an extremely wide range of situations.
The second strategy aims to provide reasons for thinking that the func-
tional dynamics in question are at work in our present situation. It does
this by anchoring the focal need in question in the most basic demands
of human nature. This is why these genealogies typically start out from
what we take ourselves to know about human beings and their situation
quite generally. We can grant that humans have had very different goals
and interests at different times, but some of their most basic needs can
plausibly be thought to exhibit more continuity. Craig starts out from needs
“so general . . . that one cannot imagine their changing whilst anything we
29 There are of course other philosophicalmethods that deploy genericmodels and general
facts, and Iwouldnotwish to claim that all of thesemethods are specifically genealogical.
Rather, I claim that a specific set among the various philosophical enterprises that call
themselves “genealogical” is really best understood as being in the business of making
sense, in the light of generic models and general facts about the kind of creatures we are,
of why we came to think and value as we do. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer
for pressing me on this point.
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can still recognize as social life persists” (1990, p. 10; 2007, p. 191). Williams
also seeks to ground his genealogy in “universal considerations” (2002, p.
172), in “motivations that people must be granted to have anyway” (2002,
p. 33). And Fricker speaks of “absolutely basic epistemic needs” (2007, p.
112), and remarks that genealogies can help us understand how our present
practices form contingent manifestations of our most basic predicaments
(1998, p. 165).
It is true that substantial commitments will thereby be undertaken
about what kinds of creatures humans are andwhat kinds of environments
they live in. Genealogical explanations, like all explanations, have to start
somewhere and take certain things for granted. But there are two respects
in which Craig, Williams, and Fricker execute their genealogical narratives
in a way that allows them to take as little for granted as possible. They do
not simply settle on a practice and then paint an innate need for just that
practice into our picture of human nature.
On the one hand, what they take for granted are structural needs like the
need to gather and share information about the immediate environment
or the need to avoid conflict: these are second-order needs that grow out of
the relations between individuals’ first-order needs (such as their need for
various types of foods, goods, and tools). Structural needs are to a large
extent counterfactually robust, because they are overwhelmingly insensitive to
the content of first-order needs—almost irrespective of what their first-order
needs are under given circumstances, humans will have a strong interest
in gathering and sharing information about their immediate environment
and in avoiding conflict.30 If there are any needs that we can be confident
humans beings have anyway, structural needs are good candidates—if only
because they already grow out of the most trivial human needs, such as
the need to locate and have access to sources of water.
On the other hand, these structural needs then form a basis from which
to derive further needs, showing how one practical exigency entails the next,
until one reaches the need to which the focal practice forms a direct func-
tional response. The need for the focal practice is thus not simply postulated
as being part of human nature, but shown to be entailed frommore primitive
30 Indeed, there is a limit to how different a form of life can be while remaining intelligible
as a variation on ours. Differences must ultimately be made sense of in terms of
similarities—variations on human life are only recognisable as such against the backdrop
of a shared set of features that make them variations on human life.
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and less controversial needs. This way of proceeding sets the genealogies
of Craig, Williams, and Fricker apart from much-maligned just-so stories
about human nature such as that of Randy and Nancy Thornhill (1983,
1992), which raised eyebrows by declaring “men’s tendency to rape” to
form an innate part of human nature.31 The genealogies of Craig, Williams,
andFricker aremoremodest in their assumptions in that they demonstrably
but fallibly derive the needs they are interested in from structural needs that
raise no eyebrows when presented as in some sense inscribed in human
nature.
There is a point to this anchoring in human nature strategy, in particular,
when focal needs we are less confident we have can be derived from root
needs we are more confident we have. It may not at all be obvious that we
need the concept of knowledge, the virtue of truthfulness, or the virtue
of testimonial justice, because they perform functions which render them
indispensable to creatures like us. When questions arise over whether
we should continue to cultivate these conceptual practices, or whether
we might and perhaps should abandon them with impunity, for instance
because we suspect them to be fetishised relics of a not yet thoroughly
disenchanted world, revealing these practices’ instrumental relations to
some of our most basic needs acts as a powerful vindication of them: it
frees them of suspicion by showing them to be rooted in basic human
needs and thereby (in a sense I shall come back to) provides reasons for us
to continue to cultivate these practices.
These genealogies thus try to meet the Continuity condition by offering
reasons to think that the focal practice is continually required and held in
place by focal needs to which it responds, and that these are derivative of
needs so basic that human beings can be assumed to have them anyway.
The question raised by Continuity is whether we now have such focal needs,
and rather than to simply assume that this is the case, these genealogies
provide an argument to the effect that the focal needs are rooted in and
constitute structural corollaries to certain basic roots needs which canmore
plausibly be assumed to be needs we have anyway. They try to meet the
Continuity condition by offering reasons to think that the focal practice
is continually required and held in place by needs to which it responds,
31 See Hufendiek (Forthcoming) for a nuanced discussion of this and other controversial
inscriptions of traits into human nature and of how these have been exploited as bases
for the critique of naturalism in the nature-nurture debate.
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and that these are derivative of needs so basic that human beings can
be assumed to have them anyway. Where these instrumental relations
between a given practice and our basic needs is not transparent to us,
genealogical explanations offer perspicuous derivations of the need for a
certain practice from needs so basic and so general that they can, with
some plausibility, be assumed to be continuous over extremely wide ranges
of situations, including ours. The genealogies thereby give us reason to
think that the focal needs are indeed with us. This does not free us entirely
from the burden of making substantial assumptions about human nature,
but it greatly reduces the load. It highlights the respects in which a given
element of our present cultural situation forms a practical response to a
basic predicament. It shows it to be rooted in functional dynamics that are
most perspicuously represented with the help of a prototypical practice,
the present manifestation of which, marked and altered by history though
it may be, still functions, at base, as a response to this same predicament.
The anchoring in human nature strategy thus aims to secure continuity
by deriving the focal need to which the focal practice responds from basic
needs humans have anyway.
The importance of these two strategies to the success of model-based
genealogies becomes particularly apparent if their argumentative structure
is laid out as follows:
Model-Based Genealogy:
(P1) In a prototypical group G, a set of root needs RN1 − RNn under root
circumstances RC1 − RCn generate a practical problem.
(P2) This generates a pragmatic pressure on G to solve the problem: the
focal need FN.
(P3) Prototypical practice Pwould meet the focal need FN by discharging
function F.
(P4) P could develop quite naturally, i.e., out of the capacities we are
prepared to grant G anyway, via the set of steps S1 − Sn .
(C1) Therefore, Pwould be bound to develop in any G that persists.
(C2) Therefore, it is rational for G to engage in P in order for F to be
discharged in G (in the sense that people with these needs under
these circumstances would welcome and, if they could do so, aim for
engagement in Pwith a view to the discharge of F).
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(P5) In the actual group G∗, there are close analogues to RN1 − RNn and
RC1 − RCn , namely RN∗1 − RN∗n and RC∗1 − RC∗n .
(C3) Therefore, it is also rational forG∗ to engage in P∗, the closest analogue
to P in G∗, in order for F to be discharged.
(C4) Therefore, the best explanation for why we go in for P∗ is that it
discharges function F.
(C5) Therefore, there is a prima facie reason for G∗ to continue P∗, and P∗ is
to that extent vindicated.
This reconstruction lays out how model-based genealogy affects the space
of reason by showing us that given that we share certain needs, we have
reasons to engage in certain reasoning-practices. What the reconstruction
of model-based genealogies also brings out is that their soft underbelly is
P5, which assumes that the root needs and root circumstances in fact obtain
in our present situation. It is this premise which the two strategies aim
to strengthen: the variables RN1-RNn and RC1-RCn are assigned to facts
about human beings and their environment that stand a good chance of
obtaining anyway, i.e. independently of the particulars a given situation,
because they are basic structural facts about the human situation picked
out under highly general and abstract descriptions.
The danger for this way of proceeding is that the explanations will end
up being too abstract and general to be informative. It is no coincidence
that genealogies in the vein of Craig,Williams, and Fricker take a piece-meal
approach: instead of trying to identify, wholesale, the function of entire
domains of human thought and action, they proceed one concept at a time,
singling out a particular thread within the tangle of our conceptual prac-
tices—such as knowledge, truthfulness, or testimonial justice—and following
it to its moorings in the needs of concept-users. Although this may not be
a necessary condition on the method’s effectiveness, it contributes to it in
two ways. On the one hand, informativeness is likely to decrease as the
level of description at which the genealogy works increases in abstraction.
Moreover, as we saw Smyth acknowledge, securing continuity will already
require working at a fairly high and abstract level of description. This sug-
gests that the way to maximise informativeness while retaining continuity
is to keep the object of investigation narrow and concrete by philosophy’s
standards—to try and show that any society will need a particular concept
or value in order to solve a specific, well-delineated, and perhaps even
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formalisable coordination problem rather than to show that any society
will need some form of ethical consciousness in order to solve coordination
problems in some form. On the other hand, working piecemeal leaves
room for the idea that our practices may be an assemblage of individually
functional elements, each tailored to its specific purpose, which do not all
fit together into a harmonious, functional whole.32 Insofar as this is the
case, it must mean that we are bound to miss the tensions and conflicts
between practices that cannot be pressed all the way together if we do not
work piecemeal; and it gives further succour to the idea that insofar as
morality as a whole can be said continually to perform a function at all,
that function is likely to be too indeterminate to retain much informative
value.
In sum, genealogies stand a good chance of overcoming continuity
failures if they (i) derive functional conclusions not from the Pleistocene,
or from any other however vaguely situated period in hominid history, but
from highly abstract functional models; (ii) use these models to identify
the focal practice’s structural roots in basic human needs and what they
entail; and (iii) take a piece-meal approach. The conclusion supported by a
successful enterprise along these lines will be that some practice we now
engage in forms a functional response to a basic problem—that it serves a
point relative to needs we are bound to share.
Such genealogies avoid continuity failures, because they operate at a
high level of description while anchoring the focal needs on which their
functional ascriptions depend, and which prima facie do not seem likely
to exhibit the necessary continuity, in more basic needs, which do. They
make ascriptions of current functionality, not on the basis of claims about a
certain period in our past, but on the basis of abstract models of our most
basic predicaments. The ascriptions of functionality are then genealogically
derived from structural origins rather than fromhistorical origins, though if
the structures in question are as continually part of the human situation as
the state-of-nature model represents them as being, these structural origins
will in turn help us understand the practice’s actual historical origins. The
crucial point, however, is that these genealogies do not assume continuity in
the practical demands we face, because precisely what they are is attempts
32 A point which Williams, following Isaiah Berlin, presses in several places (1981; 2011,
p. 170).
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to identify bases of continuity in those demands. They are not arguments
depending on continuity, but arguments for it.
It follows from such a broadly functionalist construal of the method of
genealogy that it will be, in the first instance, vindicatory. Asking why we
go in for a certain practice first points us to the respects in which it does
something for us. It would of course be Panglossian optimism to think that
this is the end of the story. As research on the emergence of so-called “bad
norms” indicates, there are many ways in which functional dynamics can
issue in something that does more harm than good.33 But for our present
concerns, the important point is that a genealogical explanation satisfying
the Continuity constraint would entail that however much harm a practice
may cause, it must also still continually prove its worth as a response to the
basic predicament which the genealogy represents us as facing in virtue of
our sharing certain basic needs.
The precise relation of functional insights to normative conclusions is
notoriously complex, and I cannot hope to fully explicate it here, but I want
to close with three observations about the general shape that this relation
takes inmodel-basedgenealogies. First, at themost general level,what these
genealogies do is to reveal how some practice helps us to live, which they
achieve by taking somethingwe are less confidentwe need (e.g., the concept
of knowledge, the value of truth, or the virtue of epistemic justice) and
deriving it as a practical corollary from something we are more confident
we need (e.g., information about our immediate environment). This can
be thought of as a non-foundationalist strategy: eschewing attempts to
derive the concepts we should live by from absolute rational foundations
in Platonic Forms or universal reason, it instead tries to foster allegiance to
certain conceptual practices by showing that they promote material that
already commands broad allegiance. The uncontroversial and basic human
needs that figure at the root of Craig’s,Williams’s, and Fricker’s genealogies
are paradigmatic examples of such material. Few will be disposed to deny
that we have these needs; what theymight be disposed to deny is that these
needs bring with them certain problems that certain conceptual practices
in turn equip us to solve; and this is where the genealogical derivations
come in, as narratives designed to bring out just how these conceptual
33 Brennan et al. (2013, ch. 8); Rosenberg (2016).
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practices in fact serve ends that the narratives’ addressees are already fully
committed to pursuing.
Second, the normative force of these functional insights will be limited
in various ways: they can give us reasons to cultivate certain concepts and
values tout court, but they cannot give us reasons for particular actions or
beliefs—they cannot tell one, say, whether to be truthful to someone on
a particular occasion. The insight into the basic functionality of a system
of epistemic division of labour based on the virtues of truthfulness, as
Williams himself notes, by itself “takes us nowhere at all” (2002, p. 84)
insofar as we want to know, when the question arises with regard to
particular pieces of information, whether we should continue to work the
system. A related limitation derives from the fact that the reasons yielded
by genealogies will often—roughly, whenever the practical value of my
doing something lies in its value to others rather than to myself—be in the
first instance reasons for the collective to cultivate certain practices rather
than reasons for the individual to participate in those practices.
Yet neither limitation brings the normative force of such genealogies
down to zero, especially on a realistic picture of who their addresseesmight
be.Whengenealogies’ addressees are realpeople rather than creatures from
the demonology of philosophy, such as the complete amoralist, they can
provide reasons for the individual by providing reasons for the collective,
notably via the thought that if everyone always defected, the beneficial
practice would break down. This imagined universalisation is itself an
ethical thought, and will therefore be no help against the amoralist.34 Yet
when the addressee is someonewho is alreadypart of an ethical community,
but whose confidence in a particular practice is wavering (due perhaps to
suspicions fostered by an austere naturalism or by postmodern irony), a
genealogy can increase that individual’s confidence in the disposition to
engage in certain conceptual practices and to treat certain considerations
as reasons.35 What Williams thought was true of any attempt to justify
the ethical life is certainly true of genealogical vindications: their “aim
34 See Williams (1973, pp. 252–253; 2011, p. 31).
35 Such reasons to cultivate dispositions remain importantly different from pragmatic
reasons for belief in the sense of reasons purporting to show directly that a given
statement is true. The reasons I am concerned with are reasons to think in terms of certain
concepts at all, whereas the reasons at issue in recent debates over pragmatic reasons
for belief are primarily reasons to think that particular contents articulated in terms of
given concepts are true (see Reisner (2009, Forthcoming) for an overview).
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is not to control the enemies of the community or its shirkers but, by
giving reason to people already disposed to hear it, to help in continually
creating a community held together by that same disposition” (2011, p.
31). Genealogies are not instruments of conversion. But they can promote
self-understanding, and thereby strengthen the confidence of those who
are, in some measure, already disposed to think and value in terms of the
concepts which the genealogies address.
Finally, it is worth highlighting that such genealogies need not focus
exclusively on instrumental reasons. They can also accommodate and
strengthen our confidence in non-instrumental reasons. Williams’s state-
of-nature model, for example, shows us that nearly any human community
has instrumental reasons to encourage dispositions of truthfulness (in the
prototypical form of dispositions of Accuracy and Sincerity) in its members,
because this contributes to the efficient pooling of information and thus,
in the long run, to the welfare of each member. But a purely functional
explanation which leaves it at that is bound to be unsatisfactory. On the one
hand, the explanationwill jarwith themanifest fact that for us, truthfulness,
like justice or loyalty, is more than a means to an end. Reducing it to its
instrumental value unduly ignores its intrinsic value. On the other hand,
if we persist in understanding truthfulness in purely functional terms,
we have trouble seeing how it could have been stable enough to fulfil its
purpose: if people were truthful only for instrumental reasons, the practice
of truthfulness would become vulnerable to free riders. Why should one,
on a given occasion, exhibit dispositions of truthfulness that promise to
pay in the long run if by making an exception, on this particular occasion,
one can reap some extra benefits for oneself without compromising the
communal practice of truthfulness?36 This familiar line of thought is all
36 This echoes Williams’s critique of indirect utilitarianism (2011; 1973): the recommenda-
tion of non-utilitarian rules on strictly utilitarian grounds is unstable under reflection
due to the lack of fit between the spirit of the justification and the spirit it justifies. A
structurally similar argument that focuses on the threat of unintelligibility rather than
instability is advancedbyMüller (2003). But the difficulty is notpeculiar to utilitarianism:
Gauthier’s (1986) argument that reflection provides players in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
with a rational basis to acquire dispositions to justice suffers from the same difficulty.
As Williams puts it, the “lack of fit between the spirit of justification and the spirit
being justified is so radical that, if the construction is exposed to reflection at all, it is
bound to unravel” (2002, p. 91). Kolodny (2005) also discusses the problem: “Why is
there reason to follow, in this particular case, the rule that promises utility over the long
run, if violating it, in this particular case, promises even more utility?” (p. 543). Like
Williams, he comes to the conclusion that what is needed to move the individual is an
intrinsic reasonto follow the rule on each and every occasion (pp. 544-45).
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the more devastating in the case of truthfulness, since the practical value
of my truthfulness—especially the practical value of my Sincerity—lies
predominantly in its value to other people. To escape this free rider problem
and to stabilise truthfulness, therefore, “there should be some dispositions
to think that telling the truth (to the right people, on the right occasions) is in
itself a good thing” (Williams 2014b, p. 408). Only in communities in which
people are disposed to assign value to truthfulness per se, thus ceasing to see
it asmerely functional, can this conceptual practice fulfil its function. Itmust
outgrow its mere functionality in order to be functional: intrinsic reasons
are required that will give one reason to be truthful even when doing so
involves forsaking opportunities for personal gain in other respects. By
helping us understand this, model-based genealogies can explain why and,
by involving themselves in history, how and in connectionwithwhich other
values we came to think in terms of intrinsic reasons now and around here
(some cultures make sense of the intrinsic value of truthfulness in terms of
honour; others in terms of freedom).37
Among the strengths of such genealogies is their capacity to avoid em-
phasising instrumental reasons at the expense of non-instrumental reasons.
As Craig pithily puts it, “with genealogy, we need neither overstress nor
overlook function” (2007, p. 198). Genealogies offer us “explanation with
reduction” (Williams 2002, p. 90), providing functional explanations of
why we came to engage in certain practices which, by highlighting the
uses of intrinsic values or the benefits of being “bloody-minded rather than
benefit-minded” (Williams 2002, p. 59), issue in vindicatory explanations
of our having further, non-instrumental or intrinsic reasons to engage in
those practices. This falls short of yielding intrinsic reasons we did not have
before. But the aim of a genealogy like Williams’s is not to give truthfulness
intrinsic value; it is to vindicate it as the intrinsic value it already is: to give
it a bill of health, showing that it makes sense that creatures like us should
accept considerations connected to truthfulness as intrinsic reasons in order
to strengthen the addressees’ confidence in those reasons.38
The conclusion we reach is that there are genealogical paths from origin
to justificationwhich neither commit the genetic fallacy nor suffer from con-
37 See Kusch (2009) and Reynolds (2017) for an account of how a similar structure can be
discerned in Craig’s genealogy of the concept of knowledge.
38 Spelling out more fully how and in what sense exactly genealogical explanation can
vindicate new reasons for action as given by intrinsic values requires a paper of its own.
I offer a fuller picture of Williams’s way of doing it in Queloz (Forthcoming).
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tinuity failure. I have focused in particular on sketching an interpretation
of the genealogies offered by Craig, Williams, and Fricker as model-based
genealogies tailored to the task of showing that a practice we might have
thought of as a contingent outgrowth of our local situation and history in
fact functions as an indispensable response to continual practical exigencies.
I have argued that this involves an inference from the structural origins of
a practice in a generic predicament to the modest but genuine vindication
of our local manifestation of it. Such an inference might still be wrong, of
course. Yet on the interpretation offered here, the problem will then not be
that it has subtly trespassed against the canons of reasoning, but simply
that it is unsound.
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